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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between coordination and social learning in a
dynamic regime change game. Social learning provides public information to which
players overreact due to the coordination motive. So coordination aects the aggre-
gation of private signals through players' optimal choices. Such endogenous provision
of public information results in inecient herds with positive probability, even though
private signals have an unbounded likelihood ratio property. Therefore, social learning
is a source of coordination failure. An extension shows that if players could individually
learn, inecient herding disappears, and thus coordination is successful almost surely.
This paper also demonstrates that along the same history, the belief convergence diers
in dierent equilibria. Finally, social learning can lead to higher social welfare when
the fundamentals are bad.
JEL Classication: C72, C73, D82, D83
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In many economic and social environments featuring coordination motives, such as invest-
ments, currency attacks, bank runs and political revolutions, agents are often uncertain
about the coordination results. So can coordination outcomes be implemented in these envi-
ronments if coordination is socially optimal? Learning about the fundamentals is a potential
way to resolve this problem: the more information agents possess, no matter whether the
incremental information is public or private, the more likely there exists an equilibrium
in which agents choose to coordinate. But is this argument true, especially in a dynamic
environment?
Imagine a dynamic world in which each individual has a noisy signal about the funda-
mentals. The public information is the behavior of previous players. If the public history
successfully aggregates private signals, the public history conveys arbitrarily accurate infor-
mation about the fundamentals, and thus coordination outcomes can be reached. Conversely,
if a herd forms, that is, if players choose \not coordinate" as most previous players did, ig-
noring their own private signals (see Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992)), the information aggregation will be unsuccessful. In this case, learning from
the public history, or social learning, may result in coordination failure. To the extent that
any decision maker's payo is independent of other players' choices, Smith and Srensen
(2000) show that the public history will successfully aggregate private signals, if and only if
the strength of private signals is unbounded.1 However, does this conclusion hold when the
economy features a coordination motive?
The above questions can be formulated as the investigation of the interaction between
coordination and social learning. In this paper, I study this interaction in a dynamic regime
change game. There are two possible regimes: the status quo and an alternative. The game
continues as long as the status quo is in place. In each period, there are two new short-
lived (one-period-lived) players. They commonly observe previous plays, and each of them
receives one piece of private information about the status quo.2 Based on this information,
they update their beliefs about the true state of the status quo, which is unknown but xed.
Because any individual can observe only one piece of private information, perfect individual
learning is impossible. These two new short-lived players then simultaneously choose to
attack or not to attack the status quo. (Attacking the status quo is the coordination action,
1Lee (1993) analyzes a social learning model with continuous action space and binary signal space. Inef-
cient herding does not appear, because no information goes unused. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1998) and Chamley (2004) provide surveys of this literature.
2As in the social learning literature, I assume players are short-lived. First, this assumption makes the
model tractable and naturally rules out perfect individual learning. Second, nite long-lived players can
coordinate to experiment as their discount factor becomes arbitrarily close to 1, further complicating the
analysis.
1which favors the regime change.) A player choosing to attack receives a positive payo if
the regime changes; she receives a negative payo otherwise. Not attacking is a safe action,
giving zero payo whether the regime changes or not. The true state of the status quo is
drawn at the beginning of the game from a set consisting of three elements: weak, medium,
and strong. If the status quo is weak, an attack by at least one player changes the regime;
if the status quo is medium, then synchronous coordination (i.e., both players choose to
attack) is required to trigger the regime change; if the status quo is strong, the status quo
can never be beaten.
The main result in this paper is shown by comparing equilibrium outcomes in the
medium state with those in the weak state. As a benchmark, in the weak state, coordination
is not necessary, so the status quo is in place only if there is no attack. But as the probability
of attacking decreases, the \no attack" history tells players less and less. This slow social
learning is eventually dominated by players' extremely informative private signals. As a
result, in any equilibrium, if the status quo is weak, inecient herds never form, and the
regime changes almost surely. Dierent from the weak state, in the medium state, when
coordination is commonly known to be necessary from a previous failing attack by one
player, in order to attack, players must form high \common beliefs" about the medium
state. Therefore, the information from the public history may dominate any private signal.
That is, if the public history makes a player pessimistic ex-ante, then, even if she receives an
extremely informative private signal favoring the medium state, she cannot be condent that
her opponent receives an \attacking" signal. So, in any equilibrium, in the medium state,
inecient herds emerge with positive probability, and the regime may not change. Therefore,
in the medium state, the informational cascades result in the impossibility of coordination,
so social learning is a source of coordination failure.
In a herd, public beliefs converge because players stop learning from the public history.
So what is the asymptotic public belief along the outcomes in which players never stop
learning from the public history? In particular, will social learning be complete if public
beliefs keep changing over time? I show that the public belief convergence diers in dierent
equilibria of this model. Take the outcome with an attack by one player in every period
as an example. Along this outcome, the weak status quo is ruled out by the failing attack
in the rst period. Then, in the most aggressive equilibrium, in which players' strategies
specify the highest possible probability of attacking in every period, the public belief about
the medium state converges to a point strictly between 0 and 1. Therefore, social learning
is incomplete in this equilibrium. In another equilibrium, in which players adopt strategies
specifying the smallest positive probabilities of attacking (if there are any), the public belief
about the medium state converges to 1, so social learning is complete in this case. In this
equilibrium, in the limit, the strategy prole puries the mixed strategy equilibrium of the
2complete information normal form game at the medium state.
Social learning not only drives the dynamics of attacking and partly determines the
eventual fate of the regime, but it also causes social welfare to dier depending on the status
quo. Considering the discounted social welfare, under a weak status quo, social learning
delays the regime change, resulting in ineciency. Under the medium status quo, social
learning results in the probability of the regime change being less than 1. Consequently,
when the discount factor is suciently close to 1, social learning leads to lower social welfare,
which is inecient. For a strong status quo, social learning prevents attacking innitely often
with probability 1, which leads to higher social welfare { provided that the discount factor
is suciently close to 1.
The dynamic regime change game rules out the possibility of perfect individual learning
and focuses on a two-player three-state case. I extend the core model in two directions. In
the rst extension, the economy consists of two types of players { { any player i in period
t is of type i (i = 1;2). Suppose in any period t, the player of type i collects all previous
private signals of type i players (but not previous private signals of type j players (i 6= j)).
So, the precision of the private signal is strictly increasing over time, and it goes to 1 in the
limit. That is, I allow perfect individual learning. In this extended model, in all nontrivial
equilibria, if the status quo is in the medium state, inecient herds do not form, and the
regime changes almost surely. In the second extension, I analyze the dynamic regime change
game with N + 1 possible states of the status quo and N new short-lived players in each
period. At state n, at least n attacks are needed to trigger the regime change. So the rst
state is like the weak status quo in the core model, while the (N+1)th state is like the strong
status quo in the core model. In this second extended model, in any monotone equilibrium
of this game, the dynamics of attacking and the eventual outcomes of the regime change are
similar to those in the core model.
1.1 Related Literature
The social value of public information has been discussed in a vast literature, pioneered by
Hirshleifer (1971). Morris and Shin (2002, 2003) analyze the eects of public information
in a model with payo complementarities. They show that increased provision of public
information is more likely to lower social welfare when players have more precise private
signals. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) prove that when the degree of coordination in the
equilibrium is higher than the socially optimal one, public information can reduce equilibrium
welfare. In this literature, the public information is exogenous. In my paper, the public
information evolves endogenously as a result of agents' decisions. Therefore, coordination
directly aects the provision of the public information. Consequently, the public history may
fail to aggregate private signals and thus provide biased public information, which results in
3coordination failure.
There is a strand of social learning models that discuss herding behaviors and asyn-
chronous coordination. In Dasgupta (2000), rst movers and late movers can coordinate, so
rst movers have incentives to signal their private signals by choosing the coordination ac-
tion. Under private signal structures with an unbounded likelihood ratio property, there are
\weak herd behaviors", in which players do not ignore their private signals. In Choi (1997),
coordination is also asynchronous, payo complementarity is only from network eects, and
learning is complete once an option is taken. Asynchronous coordination imposes a weaker
belief requirement than synchronous coordination, which is the key ingredient of my paper.
In addition, it is easy to show that if coordination is asynchronous, inecient herds never
form in my model.
This paper contributes to the global game literature, initiated by Carlsson and Van
Damme (1993). Absent the dynamic aspect, static regime change games have been applied
to currency attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005),
debt crises (Morris and Shin, 2004), and political changes (Edmond, 2008). These static
regime change games are solvable by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for
xed prior beliefs and arbitrarily informative private signal structures (see Morris and Shin,
2003). In my model, if no attack has happened yet, players are in a static global game. But
in this static global game, multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria may exist. Such multiplicity
follows two characterizations of the model. First, because the state space is discrete, there
are some prior beliefs resulting in multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria, no matter how large
the precision of private signals is. The necessity of the connectedness of the state space for
the equilibrium uniqueness is discussed in Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), and my model
provides a counter example. Second, the precision of private signals is xed, while public
beliefs evolve endogenously over time.
In a recent paper, Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) incorporate both individual
learning and social learning into a dynamic regime change game.3 They consider a continuum
of long-lived agents, each learning the true state eventually by collecting one piece of private
information in every period. Players also learn from the publicly observable fact that the
regime has not changed. Furthermore, in an extension, all players observe public and private
signals about the previous attacking sizes. My model diers from Angeletos, Hellwig, and
Pavan (2007) mainly in that individual learning is impossible. As shown in my rst extended
model, individual learning overturns the social learning eect, so inecient herding does not
emerge, even when coordination is commonly known to be necessary. Hence, to analyze the
3Dynamic regime change games are studied as examples of dynamic global games. Dasgupta (2007)
studies a two-period model dynamic global game, which allows asynchronous coordination. Other papers
contributing to this growing literature include Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2007) and Heidhues and Melissas
(2006).
4interaction between coordination and social learning, one needs to go one step back to a
model without individual learning. Related to the interaction between individual learning
and coordination is the paper by Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008). They show
that with a nite state space and conditional independent private signals, individual learning
implies common learning. Therefore, since common learning is exogenous, and social learning
may be suspended endogenously, high common beliefs about the medium state are formed
innitely often. As a result, inecient herds disappear, and thus, the regime changes almost
surely if the status quo is medium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce a dynamic
regime change game and provide an algorithm to characterize all equilibria. In section 3,
I study the eects of social learning on the dynamics of attacking, the eventual fate of the
status quo, and the social welfare. Section 4 is devoted to two extensions of the core model.
Section 5 concludes. All omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 A Dynamic Regime Change Game
2.1 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 f1;2;:::g. There are two possible regimes: the status
quo and an alternative. Denote the state of the regime at the end of period t by Rt 2 f0;1g:
Rt = 0 means the status quo, and Rt = 1 means the alternative. Assume the regime is in
the status quo at the beginning of the game, so R0 = 0; if Rt = 1 for some t, then R = 1 for
all  > t; that is, once the regime changes, it stays in the alternative forever. The strength
of the status quo is described by  2   fw;m;sg, where w;m;s 2 R with the order
w < m < s.4 At the beginning of the game,  is chosen by nature according to a commonly
known distribution 1, where 1() > 0, 8 2 . Once picked,  is xed forever.
In each period t, there are two new short-lived players. Each player i chooses ait 2
f0;1g, where ait = 1 means \attack," and ait = 0 means \not attack." Player i's ex-post
payo depends on both her choice and the state of the regime: uit = (1 Rt 1)ait(Rt  c)+
Rt 1(1   c). Hence, suppose the regime is in the status quo at the beginning of period t
and the regime changes in that period. If player i chooses to attack, she receives the payo
1 c (c 2 (1=2;1)); if in such a period, player i chooses not to attack, she receives the payo
0. If the regime is in the alternative state at the beginning of period t, then no matter
what player i chooses, she receives payo 1   c.5 Thus, once the regime changes, the game
essentially ends. Conditional on Rt 1 = 0, whether the regime changes or not in period t
4Notations w,m and s refer to \weak," \medium" and \strong," respectively.
5Assuming players receive payo 1 c after the regime changes to the alternative is equivalent to assuming
that the game ends once the regime changes, in terms of the strategic analysis. But this assumption makes
the welfare analysis in subsection 3.3 much easier.
5depends on both the strength of the status quo  and the number of attacks a1t + a2t. For
the weak status quo, the attack by one player is sucient for the regime change; for the
medium status quo, the attack by one player is not enough, but the attack by two players
can trigger the regime change; if the status quo is strong, the regime never changes. The
following table summarizes the regime change outcomes conditional on Rt 1 = 0:
a1t + a2t  = w  = m  = s
0 Rt = 0 Rt = 0 Rt = 0
1 Rt = 1 Rt = 0 Rt = 0
2 Rt = 1 Rt = 1 Rt = 0
Before making the decision, period t player i observes a private signal xit =  + it.
it  N(0;1=), where  2 R++ is the common precision of players' private signals.6 it is
independent of  and independent across i and across t. Thus, all players' private signals
are conditionally independent. Besides private signals, at the beginning of any period t  2,
players are aware of the public history about the number of players choosing to attack ( < t).
Denote a typical public history by ht = (b1;:::;bt 1), where b 2 f0;1;2g is the number of
players attacking in period  for all  < t. Let Ht be the set of all possible public histories
at the beginning of period t. I dene a period t player i's strategy by sit : Ht  R ! f0;1g.
So sit(ht;xit) is the action player i chooses, given the public history ht and private signal
xit. Let t(ht) be period t players' common prior belief about , conditional on the public
history ht. Call t the public belief in period t.
Denition 1 An assessment

(sit)
i=1;2
t=1;:::;(t)t=1;:::
	
is an equilibrium if
1. For any t, given t, (s1t;s2t) forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the static game;
2. t is calculated by Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path.
The rst part of the denition is a natural requirement of the assumption that players
are short-lived. Because period t players have no intertemporal incentive when making
decisions, their strategies need to form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a static game given
their public belief t. The second part of the denition only species how to calculate public
6By the Gaussian assumption, it is easy to calculate players' belief updates. In addition, the Gaussian
assumption has a very clear description about the precision of players' signals. However, this assumption is
not necessary. The distribution of the signal can be fairly general, and the assumptions I have to make are
the following: (1) conditional on , the players' private signals are independent and identically distributed;
(2) the support of xit is an open interval (X;  X)  R; and the conditional density f(xj) of the signal is
strictly positive for all x 2 (X;  X) and all  2 ; (3) unbounded likelihood ratio: lim
x!X
f(xj)=f(xj0) = +1
and lim
x!  X
f(xj)=f(xj0) = 0, whenever  < 0; and (4) monotone likelihood ratio: if  < 0, f(xj)=f(xj0) is
strictly decreasing in x.
6beliefs on the equilibrium path. In fact, as in the denition of a sequential equilibrium,
the consistency requirement should be imposed on the o-equilibrium path. However, since
players' strategies must form a static game Bayesian Nash equilibrium, their equilibrium
strategies are not aected by plays on the o-equilibrium path. Therefore, to simplify the
analysis, I only require public beliefs on the equilibrium path be calculated by Bayes' rule.
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
From the denition, an equilibrium can be characterized in two steps: rst, given any t,
calculate (s1t;s2t), which constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period t; second, given
1, ht and (si)
i=1;2
=1;t 1, employ Bayes' rule to calculate t. To simplify, if the environment is
understood clearly, I use the term \equilibrium" for both the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
the static game and the equilibrium in the dynamic game.
Three facts should be noted before detailed analysis. First, since 1() > 0 for all
 2 , and the regime does not change with probability 1 if there is no attack, t() > 0
for all  2  after the public history without any attack. Second, if one player attacks in
period t and Rt = 0, players in the subsequent periods learn immediately that  6= w, that
is, (w) = 0 for all  > t. Third, if both players attack in period t and Rt = 0, players
learn immediately that  = s. Therefore, as for the analysis of a static game, only three
possible public beliefs are relevant: (i) t() > 0 for all  2 ; (ii) t(w) = 0, t(m) > 0
and t(s) > 0; (iii) t(s) = 1. Note, since 1() > 0 for all  2 , in any period t,
t() > 0 implies t(0) > 0 for  < 0. Among these three cases, the one with t(s) = 1 is
trivial. Because \not attack" is the dominant action in this case, the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is that both players choose not to attack for all their private signals.
Now, suppose t() > 0 for all  2 . Let (jxit) denote period t player i's posterior
belief over  after receiving signal xit. Then from Bayes' rule, the posterior belief about 
is:
(jxit) =
t()(
p
(xit   ))
P
02
t(0)(
p
(xit   0))
;
where () is the standard normal pdf. Player i's interim payo from attacking given signal
xit and player j's strategy sjt is:
Exjtuit(1;xit;sjt)
= (wjxit) + Pr(sjt = 1;mjxit)   c (1)
= (wjxit) + (mjxit)Pr(sjt = 1jm)   c (2)
=
t(w)(
p
(xit   w))
P
02
t(0)(
p
(xit   0))
+
t(m)(
p
(xit   m))
P
02
t(0)(
p
(xit   0))
Pr(sjt = 1jm)   c: (3)
7The fact that (1) implies (2) is because players' private signals are independent conditional
on . Note (wjxit) ! 1 as xit !  1; hence, from the regime change rule, attacking is the
dominant action for player i, when xit is extremely negative. By continuity of the interim
payo function, there exists an xt 2 R such that Exjtuit(1;xit;sjt) > Exjtuit(0;xit;sjt);8xit 
xt and 8sjt. I call the set ( 1;xt] the dominant region of attacking. Similarly, there is an
 xt 2 R such that Exjtuit(1;xit;sjt) < Exjtuit(0;xit;sjt);8xit   xt and 8sjt, so the set [ xt;+1)
is called the dominant region of not attacking. Therefore, in the case t() > 0 for all  2 ,
players in period t play a static global game. Proposition 1 below not only proves the
existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium but also provides the equation to characterize the
equilibrium in this case.
Proposition 1 In a static game with t() > 0 for all  2 , a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
exists. In any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, players follow a symmetric cuto strategy with
threshold point x
t 2 R:7
s

t =
(
1; if x  x
t;
0; if x > x
t:
In addition, x
t is the solution to the equation
G(x;t) =
t(w)(
p
(x   w))
P
02
t(0)(
p
(x   0))
+
t(m)(
p
(x   m))
P
02
t(0)(
p
(x   0))
(
p
(x   m))   c = 0; (4)
where () is the standard normal cdf.
Now consider the boundary public belief case: t(w) = 0, t(m) > 0 and t(s) >
0. Because t(w) = 0, there is no dominant region of attacking; since t(s) > 0, the
dominant region of not attacking still exists; t(m) > 0 implies that the regime may change
if both players choose to attack. Hence, players in this case are playing a coordination game.
Obviously, the strategy prole with coordination failure, that is, both players choose not to
attack, is an equilibrium. So is no attack the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period t?
That is, are there any equilibria with positive probability of attacking?
The only state for which the regime can change is  = m, so players choose to attack
only if both their beliefs about  = m and their beliefs about their opponents choosing to
attack are suciently high. Therefore, if players' public belief about  = m is high (players
are optimistic), cooperation is possible; conversely, when players' public belief about  = m
is low (players are pessimistic), even if one player observes an extremely negative signal and
is convinced that  = m, she won't attack. This is because she believes that the probability
7To simplify notation, I denote a strategy by x
t when there is no confusion. In particular, x
t =  1
represents the strategy not attacking for all signals, and x
t = +1 represents the strategy attacking for all
signals.
8of her opponent observing a signal favoring  = m is very low. With the suciently informa-
tive signals assumption given below (I maintain this assumption throughout), Proposition 2
formally shows the above intuition.
Assumption 1 Private signals are suciently informative: (
p

2 (s   m)) > c.
Proposition 2 In the static game with t(w) = 0, t(m) > 0 and t(s) > 0, 9~ (m) 2 (0;1)
such that
1. If t(m) < ~ (m), there is no equilibrium with attack;
2. If t(m) > ~ (m), there are two equilibria with attack, which are symmetric and in
cuto strategies. The threshold point for any equilibrium is in (m;+1);
3. If t(m) = ~ (m), there exists a unique ~ x 2 (m;+1) such that (~ x; ~ x) is the unique
equilibrium with attack.
The key step to prove Proposition 2 is to analyze the solution to equation (4), with
the parameter t(w) = 0, t(m) > 0 and t(s) > 0: if G(x;t) = 0 does not have a solution,
then the no attack strategy prole is the unique equilibrium; if G(x;t) = 0 has a solution
x
t, then there exists an equilibrium in which players employ a symmetric cuto strategy
with threshold point x
t. The parameter ~ (m) is determined by the following equation
max
x2R
G(x; ~ ) = 0; (5)
and ~ x is the solution to the equation G(x; ~ ) = 0.
Since when (w) = 0, it is hard to analyze solutions to G(x;) = 0, I dene
g(x;) =

(
p
(x   m))   c

  c(
1
(m)
  1)exp[

2
(s   m)(2x   s   m)]:
Then when (w) = 0, G(x;) = (mjx)g(x;). Because (mjx) > 0 for all x 2 R, when
(w) = 0, G(x;) = 0 if and only if g(x;) = 0. And since g(x;) has nice properties,
whenever (w) = 0, instead of G(x;) = 0, I analyze solutions to the equation g(x;) = 0.
With Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the following algorithm characterizes all equi-
libria:
1. In any period t, given t, compute all solutions to G(x;t) = 0 and pick any solution
x
t to be the threshold point in period t. If G(x;t) = 0 does not have a solution, then
let x
t =  1;
2. On the equilibrium path, conditional on Rt = 0, given t, x
t and bt, employ Bayes'
rule to calculate t+1.
92.3 Multiple Equilibria
From the above equilibrium characterization algorithm, multiple equilibria exist. The mul-
tiplicity is not due to plays on the o-equilibrium path but stems from the structure of the
dynamic regime change game.
From Proposition 2, when  = w is ruled out (after observing a failing attack by one
player in some period), if t(m)  ~ (m), G(x;t) = 0 has at least one solution; so there
are multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria in period t. Thus, there must be multiple equilibria
in the dynamic regime change game. This kind of multiplicity is driven by the coordination
property when (w) = 0, as in Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007).8
However, in the dynamic regime change game, there is another source for multiplicity.
After a history ht without any attack, period t players are still in a global game. In the static
global game literature, the state space is usually assumed to be connected. Then, for a given
prior belief, as the precision of private signals becomes arbitrarily large, a unique equilibrium
of the static regime change game can be established by interim iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies (Morris and Shin (2003)). But in my model, two features lead to
multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria in the stage game after the no attack history. First, as
discussed by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), with a nite state space, multiple Bayesian
Nash equilibria exist when players' common prior beliefs put a suciently high weight on the
medium state (no matter how large  is). Second, the precision of private signals is xed,
while players' public beliefs evolve endogenously. Since there exist public beliefs in period
t with t() > 0 for all  2 , such that multiple Bayes Nash equilibria exist in period t
(see the discussion in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix for details), the dynamic
regime change game has multiple equilibria.
The equilibrium denition requires that all players commonly know the strategies
adopted by previous players, that is, x
t is common knowledge to all players arriving af-
ter period t. The emergence of multiple equilibria makes this assumption even stronger. For
example, when state w is ruled out and t(m) > ~ t(m), no attack in period t is consistent
with both the strategy prole ( 1; 1) (the pure no attack strategy prole) and the strat-
egy prole (x
t;x
t) with x
t > m (when both players' private signals land above x
t). However,
the belief consistency is part of an equilibrium in the dynamic regime change game, so this
common knowledge assumption is natural when an equilibrium is xed. Therefore, in all
the analysis in section 3, the strategy prole is xed. In addition, I will show that attacking
dynamics in dierent equilibria are driven by dierent social learning processes and, thus,
have dramatically dierent properties.
Two classes of equilibria have nice properties and are easy to analyze, which I dene
8In their model, after the rst period, players lose the dominant region of attacking, so players are in a
coordination game from the second period on.
10as follows:
Denition 2 Emax = f(x
t;x
t)t=1;:::;(
t)t=1;:::g is the equilibrium in which, given 
t, for any
(x0
t;x0
t) forming a static equilibrium in period t with prior belief 
t, x0
t  x
t.
Denition 3 Emin = f(x
t;x
t)t=1;:::;(
t)t=1;:::g is the equilibrium in which, given 
t, for any
(x0
t;x0
t) forming an equilibrium in period t with prior belief 
t and x0
t 2 R (if exists), x
t 2 R
and x
t  x0
t; if there is no such x0
t, x
t =  1.
So Emax is the equilibrium in which players choose the most aggressive strategy in their own
period, and Emin is the equilibrium in which players choose the lowest possible cooperation
strategy in their own period. Figure 1 shows how the cuto points in Emax and Emin are
determined, when (w) = 0 and (m) > ~ (m).
Figure 1: Function G(x;) with 3(m) > 2(m) > ~ (m) > 1(m).
3 Dynamics of Attacking, Regime Change, and Social
Learning
In this section, I describe the equilibrium dynamics of attacking, and, based on these dynam-
ics, I analyze the eventual outcome of the regime change conditional on the strength of the
status quo. Because social learning is the driving force behind the dynamics of attacking, I
investigate how social learning plays a role in the dynamics of attacking and in determining
regime change outcomes. Additionally, as shown in subsection 3.3, in dierent states, social
learning has dierent eects on social welfare.
113.1 Dynamics of Attacking and Regime Change
Let ^ ht  (0;:::;0) denote the history without any attack. When  = w, conditional on
Rt 1 = 0, ^ ht is the only history period t players can observe. So the dynamics of attacking
along ^ ht determine the eventual outcome of the regime change, conditional on  = w. Hence,
I rst study the dynamics of attacking along ^ ht.
Given 1 and a xed strategy prole, conditional on Rt 1 = 0, period t players' public
belief t after ^ ht can be calculated as
t() =
1()
t 1 Q
=1
[(
p
(   x
))]2
P
02
1(0)
t 1 Q
=1
[(
p
(0   x
))]2
; 8 2 ; (6)
where [(
p
(   x
))]2 is the conditional (on ) probability that both players in period 
observe signals landing above the cuto point x
. Because 1() > 0 for all  2 , x
1 2 R
from Proposition 1, which in turn implies that 2() > 0 for all  2 . Then, by induction,
along the history ^ ht, t() > 0 for all  2 , and x
t 2 R. Because of the monotone
likelihood ratio property of private signals, in any particular period t, attacks happen with
the highest probability in the weak state. Thus, the no attack outcome in period t lowers
period t + 1 players' belief about  = w. As a result, along ^ ht, ft(w)gt is a bounded and
strictly decreasing sequence, which converges to 1(w)  0. If 1(w) > 0, the dominant
region of attacking has a positive measure in the limit; so the probability of attacking is
bounded away from 0, then t(w) ! 0 from the belief updating equation (6). Hence, t(w)
must converge to 0. For the probability of attacking along ^ ht, suppose there is an innite
subsequence of attacking probabilities that are bounded away from 0; that is, there exists
 > 0 such that all terms in this subsequence are greater than . Therefore, there exists
T such that after the history ^ hT, players' public beliefs about  < s are so low that the
cuto points after period T should be arbitrarily negative. But in the subsequence, that
the probability of attacking is bounded away from 0 implies that the corresponding cuto
points are bounded below. This contradiction implies that the probability of attacking is
converging to 0. These arguments are formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Fix any equilibrium. Along ^ ht, t(w) ! 0 and Pr(bt > 0j^ ht) ! 0.
When the status quo is weak, the attack by one player can trigger the regime change.
But because of the dominant region of not attacking, in any equilibrium, players choose not
to attack with positive probability in any period. Also, because the probability of attacking
converges to 0, the asymptotic probability of the regime change when  = w depends on
the speed at which the probability of attacking converges to 0. If it is too fast, the status
12quo may not fall. But while players continue to learn, they learn slowly after some period
T, because the probability of attacking is arbitrarily small for all t > T. This slow social
learning process implies that the probability of attacking cannot converge to 0 too fast. As
a result, the regime changes eventually if the status quo is weak.
Proposition 4 If  = w, in any equilibrium, the regime changes almost surely.
Proof. Fix an equilibrium, the strategy prole and the prior belief induce a probability
measure P on the outcome space f0;1;2g1. Suppose Pw and ^ P are probability measures
induced on f0;1;2g1 by P, conditioning on the state w and the set fm;sg, respectively.
Hence, P = 0(w)Pw + (1   0(w))^ P.
The sequence ft(w)gt is a bounded martingale adapted to the ltration Ft, which is
generated by the history Ht under the measure P. So ft(w)gt converges P   almost surely
to 1(w). Since Pw is absolutely continuous with respect to P, t(w) ! 1(w);Pw  
almost surely.
Now suppose there is a set A  f0;1;2g1 such that 1(w)[a] = 0;8a 2 A, and
Pw(A) > 0. Bayes' rule implies that the odds ratio f(1 t(w))=t(w)gt is a Pw martingale,
so E[
1 t(w)
t(w) ] =
1 0(w)
0(w) for all t. However, E[
1 t(w)
t(w) ] = E[
1 t(w)
t(w) (A)]+E[
1 t(w)
t(w) (1 (A))],
where  is the indicator function. Obviously, the second term is nonnegative, while the rst
term is bigger than
1 0(w)
0(w) for very big t since 1(w)(a) = 0; 8a 2 A, which leads to a
contradiction. Therefore, 1(w) > 0;Pw   almost surely.
Since, along ^ ht, t(w) ! 1(w) = 0, ^ ht is a 0 measure event under Pw. As a result, the
regime changes almost surely when the status quo is weak (because ^ h1 is the only outcome
in which the weak status quo never falls).
The conclusion that the weak status quo falls almost surely is due to the assumptions
about private signals. In my model, private signals are normally distributed, so they have
continuous support and an unbounded likelihood ratio property. In particular, the existence
of a dominant region of attacking implies that there are always private signals that can
overturn the public beliefs.
Now let me turn to the analysis of the medium status quo. In the rst period, because
1() > 0 for all  2 , Proposition 1 implies that the probability of attacking in the
rst period is positive. Hence, the medium status quo falls with positive probability. So
does the medium status quo fall almost surely? Because each player's private signal has
the unbounded likelihood ratio property, for any prior beliefs, there are signals making her
posterior belief about  < s arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore, it seems that in a nontrivial
equilibrium (in which players choose to attack with positive probability whenever possible),
13with probability 1, there is one period in which both players in that period receive signals
informing them that  < s. As a result, the medium status quo should fall almost surely.
But is this argument right?
Consider the outcome  h1  (1;0;:::), in which there is an attack by one player in
the rst period but no attacks afterward. If this outcome is reached, the medium status quo
does not fall. This outcome may be consistent with many equilibria: for any given subset
Q  N n f1g, only period t 2 Q players attack the status quo with positive probability, and
players in all other periods adopt the pure no attack strategy. In the strategy prole with
nite Q, the outcome  h1 is reached with strictly positive probability. Hence, unless there is
an equilibrium in which Q is innite, in any equilibrium, the regime dose not change with
positive probability if the status quo is medium.
From the failing attack in the rst period, players rule out the weak state. By Propo-
sition 2, in any t 2 Q, the probability of attacking is bounded away from 0. Then the ob-
servation of \no attack" in period t 2 Q makes subsequent players increasingly pessimistic.
Also, the necessary condition for period t 2 Q players to attack with positive probability is
t(m)  ~ (m). So if Q is innite, after a period T 2 Q, players' public beliefs about  = m
drop below ~ (m), which contradicts the assumption that Q is innite.
Proposition 5 There exists Q 2 N, such that in any equilibrium, along the outcome  h1,
there are at most Q periods in which players' strategies specify positive probabilities of at-
tacking.
Corollary 1 In any equilibrium, Pm( h1) > 0, so the regime does not change with positive
probability when the status quo is medium.
The outcome  h1 is just an example of all outcomes, which result in the survival of
the status quo and are realized with positive probabilities in any equilibrium, conditional on
the medium state. All these outcomes share three features: (1) there is no period in which
both players choose to attack; (2) there are nite (at least one) periods in which one player
chooses to attack; and (3) after the last period in which one player chooses to attack, no
attack happens ever again. These are herding outcomes; that is, players in later periods
join the \not attack" herds, ignoring their own private signals no matter how informative
such signals are. These herding outcomes are inecient, because conditional on the medium
status quo, the (attacking;attacking) strategy prole Pareto dominates the no attacking
strategy prole. I will analyze the social welfare due to these herding outcomes in more
detail in subsection 3.3.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the weak state with those in the medium state,
we can see the interaction between coordination and social learning. \Not attack" herds do
14not appear in the weak state, as in Smith and Srensen (2000). But in any equilibrium,
players join the \not attack" herds with positive probability when the status quo is medium.
The dierence stems from the coordination requirement in the medium state and the signal
structure of global games. Consider an equilibrium in which whenever strategies inducing
positive probability of attacking can form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in any period t,
period t players adopt such strategies. When the belief about the weak status quo is positive,
extreme negative signals lead players to attack, no matter what their opponents choose. This
is the reason why \not attack" herds never start in the weak state. In the medium state,
once the weak status quo is ruled out, it is common knowledge that coordination is necessary
for their attacks to succeed. Therefore, in order to coordinate, players in the same period
must form high common beliefs about  = m. That is, x any q 2 (0;1), players must
believe  = m with probability at least q, must believe with probability at least q that
their opponents believe  = m with probability at least q, and so on (see, e.g., Monderer
and Samet (1989) and Morris and Shin (2007)). When the public belief about  = m is
suciently low, to form high common belief about  = m, the precision of private signals
must be big enough. However, in the model, the precision of private signals is xed, and
along the outcome  h1 players' public beliefs about  = m decrease. Therefore, players
cannot form high common beliefs about  = m eventually, and thus the \not attack" herds
start.
The herding outcome is due to the informational externality, which is dierent from
the pure coordination failure. In some equilibria, after the weak status quo is ruled out,
players simply choose not to attack. This \no attack" outcome is purely because of coordi-
nation failure. Proposition 5 shows, however, that the informational externality causes the
impossibility of coordination in all equilibria.
3.2 Belief Convergence in Dierent Equilibria
After the weak status quo is ruled out, Proposition 5 implies that, in all equilibria, along the
outcome  h1, public beliefs about the medium status quo converge to 1(m) 2 (0;1). This
convergence is just because players stop learning from the public history after some period.
Now, let's consider an outcome, along which players never stop learning from the public
history after the weak status quo is ruled out, that is, public beliefs about the medium state
change over time. Then, will t(m) necessarily converge to 1, if the status quo is medium?
This subsection shows that the answer to this belief convergence question diers in dierent
equilibria.
Fix an equilibrium. Suppose the weak status quo has been ruled out by period t, and
there is an attack by one player in period t. Then given t, how period t + 1 players form
their public beliefs about the medium status quo depends on the threshold point of period
15t players' strategies.
Lemma 1 Given t, and suppose the attack by one player in period t fails. Then jt+1(m)   t(m)j
is strictly increasing in
 x
t   m+s
2
 . Moreover, t+1(m)  t(m) if and only if x
t  m+s
2 .
Because only the medium state and the strong state are in the support of period t+1 players'
public beliefs, if x
t = m+s
2 , then bt = 1 is neutral in terms of belief updating. Hence, the
further x
t is away from m+s
2 , the more informative the attack by one player in period t is.
To simplify the analysis, I assume ~ x < m+s
2 . (Recall that ~ x is the solution to the
equation G(x; ~ ) = 0, where ~ (w) = 0 and max
x G(x; ~ ) = 0.) Also, denote by 0 the public
belief that 0(w) = 0 and m+s
2 is the largest solution to the equation G(x;0) = 0. Consider
the outcome ~ h1  (1;1;:::) (exactly one player chooses to attack in every period).
Proposition 6 Suppose ~ x < m+s
2 . Along the outcome ~ h1.
1. In Emax, t(m) monotonically converges to 0(m) 2 (0;1). So conditional on  = m,
the probability of attacking converges to [
p

2 (s   m)].
2. In Emin, t(m) converges to 1. The probability of attacking is strictly decreasing over
time; and conditional on  = m, the probability of attacking converges to c, the cost of
attacking.
The detailed proof is in the Appendix, but the intuition is illustrated in the following gures.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 present t+1(m) as a function of t(m) along the outcome ~ h1 in Emax
and Emin respectively. In Figure 2, 0(m) is the unique xed point in (~ (m);1). Therefore,
in Emax, along ~ h1, t(m) ! 0(m), which implies that the cuto point converges to m+s
2
and that the probability of attacking converges to [
p

2 (s   m)]. In Figure 3, the unique
xed point greater than ~ (m) is 1, and it is stable. This means along ~ h1, t(m) ! 1.
Hence, the probability of attacking converges to c. So the equilibrium strategy prole in
the limit puries the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the complete information normal
form game when  = m. (In fact, in the complete information normal form game when
 = m, the mixed strategy equilibrium is the lowest possible coordination equilibrium.)
The monotonicity stated in Proposition 6 can be seen in Figure 1: if t+1(m) > t(m),
g(x;t+1) > g(x;t);8x > m, so x
t+1 > x
t in Emax and x
t+1 < x
t in Emax.
Proposition 6 shows that along the outcome ~ h1, the convergence of t(m) diers in
Emax and Emin. In Emax, the failing attack by one player in period t results in t+1(m)
strictly between t(m) and 0(m), which in turn implies that x
t+1 is strictly between x
t and
m+s
2 (see Figure 1). Then bt+1 = 1 is less informative than bt = 1 by Lemma 1. Because the
attack by one player is less informative over time, the public belief about the medium status
quo converges to 0(m) 2 (0;1). Conversely in Emin, the attack by one player is increasingly
16Figure 2: Evolution of Public Beliefs in Emax.
Figure 3: Evolution of Public Beliefs in Emin.
informative over time, because the threshold points of players' strategies are decreasing over
time (from Figure 1, all threshold points in Emin are smaller than s+m
2 ). As a result, in Emin,
along ~ h1, t(m) converges to 1. Put dierently, along the same outcome ~ h1, in Emax, the
public history provides decreasingly informative evidence over time, so the social learning is
incomplete. But in Emin, the public history provides increasingly informative evidence over
time, so the social learning is complete.
3.3 Social Welfare
In this section, I analyze the eect of social learning on social welfare. Imagine the scenario
that all players believe they are in a static regime change game, so that there is no social
learning. From Proposition 1, in any equilibrium, players attack the status quo with positive
probability (bounded away from 0) in each period. Consider the ex-post social welfare
W = (1   )
1 P
t=1
t 1(u1t + u2t), where  2 (0;1) is the discount factor. By comparing the
social welfare functions of the regime change game with and without social learning, the
17eect of social learning can be seen from the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Compare with the scenario without social learning,
1. if  = w, in both Emax and Emin, for any  2 (0;1), social learning leads to ineciency;
as  goes to 1, this ineciency disappears;
2. if  = m, in any equilibrium, there exists m 2 (0;1), such that social learning is
inecient for any  2 (m;1);
3. if  = s, in any equilibrium, there exists s 2 (0;1), such that social learning leads to
a higher social welfare value for all  2 (s;1).
The intuition behind the rst part of this proposition comes from the delayed regime
change due to social learning. Because the delay is only nitely long, when the discount
factor is suciently large, such ineciency disappears. In the second part, when  = m,
social learning leads players to stop attacking with positive probability, so the regime does
not change with positive probability, which is inecient because positive utilities after the
regime change cannot be collected. In the third case, the smaller the number of attacks, the
higher the social welfare, because the regime cannot be beaten. Since social learning can
prevent innitely many attacks, it is more ecient.
Consider the ex-ante social welfare. Part 1 of Proposition 7 implies that social welfare
with and without social learning are almost the same when  is suciently close to 1. As a
result, whether social learning leads to ineciency depends only on the comparison between
1(m) and 1(s). In particular, as  ! 1, the higher 1(m)=(1(m) + 1(s)), the lower the
ex-ante social welfare with social learning.
4 Extensions
In this section, I consider two extensions of the dynamic regime change game. In the rst
extension, I assume period t player i is of type i (i = 1;2). Then suppose period t player
i collects all previous private signals of type i players (but not previous private signals
of type j players (i 6= j)). Hence, the precision of private signals increases to +1. This
extension captures the idea of inter-generational information transmissions and demonstrates
the eect of individual learning in the dynamic regime change game. The second extension
models an N-player (N +1)-state dynamic regime change game. Restricted to the monotone
equilibrium, I get results very similar to those in the core model.
184.1 Individual Learning
In the dynamic regime change game, because players are short-lived, they can observe only
one piece of private information. Hence, no one can individually learn the true state, given
that the precision of private signals, , is a constant. Consequently, when  = w is ruled
out, the critical belief ~ (m) is constant over time. (Recall that, if the weak status quo has
been ruled out and players' public beliefs about the medium status quo are below ~ (m),
they choose not to attack, ignoring their private signals.) As a result, in any equilibrium,
along the history  ht  (1;0;:::;0), there is a nite subset Q  N n f1g such that after the
rst period attack, only in period t 2 Q, do players adopt strategies inducing a positive
probability of attacking. Since after period maxfQg, players choose not to attack for all
their own private signals, no subsequent player updates her public belief about  = m from
the no attack outcome after period maxfQg. So t(m) = maxfQg+1(m) < ~ (m) for all
t  maxfQg+1, and period t players will choose not to attack for any private signals. This
analysis leads to Proposition 5.
So what happens if individual learning is allowed? In particular, does the \not attack"
herd in Proposition 5 start in a dynamic regime change game with individual learning?
Furthermore, can players with private learning change the regime when the status quo is
medium? To answer these questions, I incorporate individual learning into the dynamic
regime change game in this extension. A straightforward way to model individual learning
is to assume that period t player i is of type i, and any player i collects private signals of
previous type i players. But period t player i could not observe previous private signals of
type j players. Because of the normal distribution, dene recursively zit = t 1
t zit 1 + 1
txit,
where zi1 = xi1. Then in terms of belief updating, period t player i's private signals could
be summarized by the sucient statistic zit  N(;1=(t)). Hence, the precision of private
signals increases over time and goes to 1.
The most interesting case is when  = m. Consider the history  ht. A failing attack
by one player in the rst period rules out  = w, so players lose the dominant region of
attacking. While the public belief about  = m keeps decreasing over time, the critical belief
~ t(m) changes over time. From Proposition 2, in any equilibrium, attacks can occur with
positive probability in period t, if and only if t(m)  ~ t(m). Since ~ t(m) goes to 0 (by
Lemma 5 in the Appendix), unless the status quo is abandoned, attacks occur in innitely
many periods. Therefore, there are equilibria in which, when  = m, the regime changes
almost surely.
There are some equilibria in which the herding result in Proposition 5 disappears
because the precision of private signals increases without bound. As the precision of players'
private signals goes to +1 (and this is common knowledge), the correlation of players'
private signals (in the same period) is arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore, when one player gets
19the private signal indicating that  = m, she assigns an arbitrarily high probability that
her opponent's private signal also indicates  = m. As a result, for a xed public belief (if,
in an equilibrium, period t players' strategies are not to attack for all signals, then period
t + 1 players' prior beliefs are the same as period t players'), there is a suciently large
precision of private signals such that attacking with positive probability is consistent with
an equilibrium.
This result is an example in the common learning literature. Modify the common
learning denition of Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson (2008) as follows:
Denition 4  2  is commonly learned, if conditional on , for any xed q 2 (0;1), a
common q-belief about  is formed innitely often.
Then for any , conditional on , players commonly learn  in any equilibrium, because
the precision of private signals increases to +1. Since conditional on  = m, a common
q-belief about  = m is formed innitely often, there exist equilibria in which the status quo
is attacked innitely many times. As a result, the medium status quo falls almost surely.
This extended model with individual learning is a modied model of Angeletos, Hellwig,
and Pavan (2007). It shows that an economy can move back and forth between \tranquility"
phases (when no attack is the unique rationalizable action) and \distress" phases (when
attack is also rationalizable for a positive measure of private signals). Proposition 5 shows
that this transition cannot happen in the dynamic regime change game without individual
learning.
4.2 N-Player (N + 1)-State Dynamic Regime Change Game
The core model has three possible levels of the strength of the status quo (jj = 3) and two
new short-lived players in each period. I now extend the core model to a dynamic regime
change game with N new short-lived players in each period and N +1 possible levels of the
strength of the status quo.
Suppose  = fm1;:::;mN+1g with N > 2 and m1 < m2 <  < mN+1, is the set
of states. When  = mk, the regime changes if and only if at least k players choose to
attack simultaneously. Hence, when  = m1, attacking is the dominant action for players,
because one player can trigger the regime change by attacking herself. When  = mN+1, not
attacking is the dominant action for players, because at least N + 1 attacks are required to
trigger the regime change, but the maximum number of possible attacks is N. In all other
states, players may cooperate at dierent levels.
Dierent from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, given some strategy prole of other
players s i, the best response of player i may not be a cuto strategy. For example, when
all other players choose to attack the status quo if and only if their private signals are in
20a small neighborhood of mN, player i's best response is to attack the status quo when xi
convinces player i that  = mN. Therefore, in this extension, I focus only on monotone
equilibria in which players' strategies are decreasing in their own private signals (so attack
for low private signals and not attack for high private signals). Lemma 6 in the Appendix
shows that if all other players are following these kinds of strategies, player i's best response
is a cuto strategy with attack for low signals and not attack for high signals. Because of
the strategic complementarity, if a monotone equilibrium exists, it is symmetric. Following
in a similar way the proof of Proposition 1, a monotone equilibrium can be shown to exist
for any interior prior belief. Also, there exists a ~ (mN+1) 2 (0;1) such that when mk is ruled
out (so that all states mk0;k0 < k are ruled out) and the public belief about  = mN+1 is
greater than ~ (mN+1), not attack is the unique rationalizable action for any private signals.
Hence, restricting attention to monotone equilibria, the static game analysis is similar to
that of the core model.
For any xed monotone equilibrium, the eventual outcome of regime change in this
extended model is similar to that of the core model. When  = m1, an N + 1 state version
of Proposition 3 implies that the status quo falls almost surely. When  = mN+1, by
assumption, the status quo never falls. For any state mk (1 < k < N + 1), inecient herds
form, and the informational cascades result in coordination failure. This result could be
shown by analyzing the dynamic of attacking along the outcome  h1 = (1;0;0;:::). The
attack in the rst period by one player cannot be successful conditional on mk (1 < k <
N + 1), so players lose the dominant region of attacking from the second period on. Then
the fact that no attack happens in a large number of periods promote players' public beliefs
about  = mN+1 above ~ (mN+1). Consequently, inecient herds emerge, and coordination
is impossible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the interaction between coordination and social learning in a dy-
namic regime change game without individual learning. I show that the inecient herding
phenomenon and the coordination failure reinforce each other. When a player believes she
can change the regime by choosing to attack herself (so coordination is not necessary), she
does not ignore her private signals. As a result, inecient herds do not form. If players
commonly know that coordination is necessary to trigger the regime change, they choose not
to attack as the unique rationalizable action for all private signals, when they are suciently
pessimistic about the coordination outcome. Consequently, private signals are not aggre-
gated, and inecient herds form. Such informational cascades result in the impossibility
of coordination, so social learning is a source of coordination failure. However, once the
21individual learning is allowed in the dynamic regime change game, players commonly learn
the true state. Therefore, the inecient herding phenomenon disappears, and coordination
is successful in some equilibria.
The interaction between social learning and coordination determines the dynamics of
attacking, predicts the eventual regime change outcome, and aects social welfare in the
dynamic regime change game without individual learning. If the status quo is weak, the
regime changes with probability 1, though the probability of attacking converges to 0 along
the no attack outcome. Conditional on the medium state, because \not attack" herds form
with a positive probability after the weak state is ruled out, the regime does not change with
a positive probability. I also show that along the outcome in which exactly one player chooses
to attack in every period, the public belief convergence exhibits very dierent properties in
dierent equilibria. In the most aggressive equilibrium, the public belief about the medium
state converges to a point strictly between 0 and 1, so social learning is incomplete. But in
the least coordination equilibrium, the public belief about the medium state converges to 1,
so social learning is complete. As a result, in the least coordination equilibrium, the strategy
prole in the limit puries the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the complete information
normal form game when the status quo is medium. Finally, I show that social welfare in
the dynamic regime change game depends on the true state. In the weak status quo, social
learning delays the regime change and thus leads to ineciency. But as the discount factor
is close to 1, such ineciency disappears. In the medium status quo, the interaction between
social learning and coordination results in inecient herds; so when the discount factor is
suciently large, social welfare is strictly lower. But in the strong status quo, because social
learning prevents innitely many attacks, it leads to higher social welfare.
The dynamic regime change game without individual learning has been applied to
numerous economic and social issues. For instance, the investment problem. A lot of projects
require synchronous coordination, and no investor can individually learn the true economic
fundamentals of the project. The analysis in this paper suggests that if the project is not
invested for a long time, it may never be invested, even though it is protable and investors'
research data could be arbitrarily informative. The model can also be used to explain herding
phenomena in currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political revolutions, in which
synchronous coordination plays a critical role and players' private signals are assumed to be
rich and powerful.
22Appendix A Omitted Proofs
This section includes proofs of Propositions and Lemmas, which are stated in the text but
not proved.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since this Proposition is about the static game, I do not use any time index in
order to simplify notation. I rst show that if a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists, it
is in cuto strategies. Because signals are conditionally independent, in equation (3),
x any sj, Pr(sj = 1jm) is a constant number less than or equal to 1. Therefore, for
any xed sj, player i's interim payo Exjui(1;xi;sj) is strictly decreasing in xi. Note
also that since lim
xi! 1Exjui(1;xi;sj) = 1   c > 0 (dominant region of attacking) and
lim
xi!+1Exjui(1;xi;sj) =  c < 0 (dominant region of not attacking), the best response to
any sj is a cuto strategy with threshold point ^ xi 2 R. Therefore, if a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium exists, it is in cuto strategies. So I represent an equilibrium prole by (^ x1; ^ x2).
Second, I show that if a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists, it is symmetric; that is, ^ x1 =
^ x2. Suppose then there is an equilibrium (^ x1; ^ x2) with ^ x1 > ^ x2. Because players are ex-ante
homogeneous, there exists another equilibrium (^ ^ x1; ^ ^ x2)=(^ x2; ^ x1). Because Exjui(1;xi;sj) is
strictly supermodular and Exjui(1; ^ xi; ^ xj) = 0, ^ xi is strictly increasing in ^ xj. Thus ^ ^ x2 = ^ x1 >
^ x2 implies ^ x2 = ^ ^ x1 > ^ x1, a contradiction.
Now consider any symmetric cuto strategy prole (x;x). Fix any public belief 
(() > 0 for all  2 ), the interim payo from attacking given the signal x and the
opponent's cuto strategy with threshold point x can be written as:
G(x;) =
(w)(
p
(x   w))
P
02
(0)(
p
(x   0))
| {z }
posterior belief about =w
+
(m)(
p
(x   m))
P
02
(0)(
p
(x   0))
| {z }
posterior belief about =m
(
p
(x   m))
| {z }
probability j attacks
 c:
Because G(x;) is continuous in x, the dominant region of attacking and dominant region
of not attacking imply that there exists x 2 R such that (x;x) is an equilibrium.
Finally, I claim that for any xed , there exists a  with () > 0 for all  2 , such
that multiple equilibria exist in this static regime change game. To show this claim, I just
need to show that there exists a  such that there are more than one solution to G(x;) = 0.
Note that lim
(m)!1
G(w+m
2 ;) = (
p

2 (w   m))   c < 0 (by c > 1
2) and lim
(m)!1
G(m+s
2 ;) =
(
p

2 (s   m))   c > 0 (by Assumption 1). Therefore, the dominant region of attacking, the
dominant region of not attacking, and the continuity of G(x;) in x imply that there are
three solutions to G(x;) = 0, one in ( 1, w+m
2 ), one in ( w+m
2 , m+s
2 ), and one in (m+s
2 ,
23+1). Furthermore, if we x  such that
(w)
(w)+(m) < c <
(m)
(m)+(s), then for any , there are
three Bayesian Nash equilibria in the static game.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
This Proposition is also about the static game, so I exclude the time index. In this
proof, the public belief  satises (w) = 0, (m) > 0 and (s) > 0. First when (w) = 0,
for a xed sj, Exjui(1;xi;sj) is strictly decreasing in xi, and the regime change game is
supermodular. So similar to the proof of Proposition 1, if an equilibrium with attacks exists,
it is symmetric and in cuto strategies. Denote a symmetric cuto strategy prole by (x;x),
then (x;x) is a non-trivial equilibrium of the regime change game if and only if G(x;) = 0.
Therefore, conditions for the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium are equivalent to those for
the existence of a solution to G(x;) = 0. Note G(x;) can be equivalently written as
G(x;) = (mjx)g(x;), where
g(x;) = [(
p
(x   m))   c]   c(
1
(m)
  1)exp[

2
(s   m)(2x   s   m)]:
For any x 2 R, (mjx) > 0, therefore x is a solution to G(x;) = 0 if and only if it is a
solution to g(x;) = 0. The rest of this proof relies on the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 2 There exist  (m);(m) 2 (0;1) with  (m) > (m), such that for all (m) 2
(0;(m)], there is no solution to g(x;) = 0; and for all (m) 2 [ (m);1), there is x 2 R
such that g(x;) = 0.
Proof.
First consider the case where (m) is close to 1. Since (
p

2 (s m)) > c, g(s+m
2 ;) > 0.
Note that for all (m) 2 (0;1), g(m;) < 0 and lim
x!+1g(x;) < 0, so by continuity of
g(x;) in x, there exist ^ x 2 (m; s+m
2 ) and ^ ^ x 2 (s+m
2 ;+1) such that g(^ x;) = 0 and
g(^ ^ x;) = 0. Therefore, there exists  (m) 2 (0;1) such that solutions to g(x;) = 0 exist
for all (m) 2 [ (m);1). Now consider (m) is close to 0. The last term of g(x;) is very
negative for any x larger than m, so g(x;) < 0 for all x > m. Combined with the fact
that g(x;) < 0 for all x  m, there exists (m) 2 (0;1) such that for all (m) 2 (0;(m)],
g(x;) < 0;8x 2 R. Finally, because  (m) can be picked as a number very close to 1 and
(m) can be picked as a number very close to 0,  (m) > (m).
Lemma 3 There exists ~ (m) 2 ( (m);(m)), such that for all (m) 2 (0; ~ (m)), there is no
solution to g(x;) = 0; and for all (m) 2 (~ (m);1), there are two solutions to g(x;) = 0.
Therefore, claims (1) and (2) in Proposition 2 are true.
24Proof.
Suppose 1 > 0(m) > 00(m) > 0 and 9x00 2 (m;+1) such that g(x00;00) = 0 (because
all x  m cannot be a solution to g(x;00) = 0). Since g(x;) is strictly increasing in
(m) for any xed x 2 R, g(x00;0) > g(x00;00) = 0. Then by the continuity of g(x;0)
and lim
x!+1g(x;0) < 0, there exists x0 2 (x00;+1) such that g(x0;0) = 0. Similarly, if
1 > 0(m) > 00(m) > 0 and g(x;0) < 0 for all x 2 R, then g(x;00) < 0 for all x 2 R.
Dene ~ (m) = inff(m) 2 (0;1) : 9x 2 R such that g(x;) = 0g = supf(m) 2 (0;1) :
g(x;) < 0 8x 2 Rg (since for a given , g(x;) either has a solution or does not have a
solution). Obviously, ~ (m) 2 ( (m);(m)).
For all (m) 2 (~ (m);1), note that
@2g
@x2 < 0 for all x  m and g(x;) has a single peak
in (m;+1). Therefore, when (m) 2 (~ (m);1), there are two solutions to g(x;) = 0.
Lemma 4 There exists a unique ~ x 2 (m;+1) such that g(~ x; ~ ) = 0. Therefore, claim (3)
in Proposition 2 is true.
Proof.
Suppose 8x 2 R, g(x; ~ ) < 0. Recall that because (m) < 1, for any x 2 ( x(~ (m));+1),
g(x; ~ (m)) < 0 (dominant region of not attacking), where  x((m)) = inffx 2 R : Exjui(1;xi;sj) <
0 for all sjg. Since Exjui(1;xi;sj) is increasing in (m),  x((m)) is an increasing function in
(m). As a result, g(x; ~ (m)) < 0 for all x >  x( (m)), because ~ (m) <  (m). Since c > 1
2,
for any , g(x;) < 0 for all x < m. Now consider the compact set [m;  x( (m))]. From
the continuity of g(x;) in x, 9^ x 2 [m;  x( (m))] such that g(x; ~ )  g(^ x; ~ ) < 0. Pick a
sequence fk(m)g such that k(m) 2 (~ (m);  (m)), k(m) > k+1(m) and k(m) ! ~ (m).
Since g(x;) is continuous in (m) for any x 2 [m;  x( (m))], lim
k!+1
g(x;k) = g(x; ~ ). Den-
ing Mk = sup
x2[m; x( (m))]
jg(x;k)   g(x; ~ )j, it can be calculated that
M
k = sup
x2[m; x( (m))]
j
1
k(m)
 
1
~ (m)
jcexp[

2
(s   m)(2x   s   m)]
= j
1
k(m)
 
1
~ (m)
jcexp[

2
(s   m)(2 x( (m))   s   m)]:
Therefore, 8 > 0;9K such that for all k > K, j 1
k(m)   1
~ (m)j < 
cexp[

2 (s m)(2 x( (m)) s m)],
which implies that Mk < . So g(x;k) converges to g(x; ~ ) uniformly, so there exists K0
such that for all k > K0, g(x;k)   g(x; ~ ) <
jg(^ x;~ (m))j
2 , thus g(x;k) <  
jg(^ x;~ (m))j
2 < 0 for
all x 2 [m;  x( (m))]. Note that, for any x < m and x >  x( (m)), g(x;k) < 0, so for all
x 2 R, g(x;k) < 0. But by the denition of ~ (m), there must be some x0 2 R such that
g(x0;k) = 0. Therefore, when (m) = ~ (m), there exists ~ x such that g(~ x; ~ ) = 0.
Now suppose x0 6= ~ x and g(x0; ~ ) = 0. Because @2h
@x2 < 0 for all x  m, there must be x00
between x0 and ~ x such that g(x00; ~ ) > 0. Then because g(x00;) is continuous in (m), x
25any  2 (0;
g(x00;~ )
2 ), there exists  > 0 such that for all 0(m) 2 (~ (m) ; ~ (m)), g(x00;) >
g(x00; ~ )    > 0. So there exists x000 2 (m;x00) such that g(x000;) = 0. This contradicts the
denition of ~ (m). Therefore, there exists a unique ~ x 2 R, such that g(~ x; ~ (m)) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose the weak status quo has been ruled out by period t. Given t, bt = 1 and x
t,
Bayes' rule implies
t+1(m) =
t(m)[
p
(x
t   m)][
p
(m   x
t)]
t(m)[
p
(x
t   m)][
p
(m   x
t)] + (1   t(m))[
p
(x
t   s)][
p
(s   x
t)]
=
t(m)
t(m) + (1   t(m))
[
p
(x
t s)][
p
(s x
t)]
[
p
(x
t m)][
p
(m x
t)]
:
Obviously, if x
t = m+s
2 , t+1(m) = t(m).
Since in the equilibrium, when t(w) = 0, x
t > m. Now, consider the case x0 and x,
such that m < x0 < x < m+s
2 . (The case m+s
2 > x > x0 is similar.) Then
[
p
(x
0   s)] < [
p
(x   s)] <
1
2
< [
p
(x
0   m)] < [
p
(x   m)]:
Because the function f(y) = y(1   y) is strictly concave and has the maximum value at
y = 1
2,
[
p
(x   s)][
p
(s   x)]
[
p
(x   m)][
p
(m   x)]
>
[
p
(x0   s)][
p
(s   x0)]
[
p
(x0   m)][
p
(m   x0)]
;
which implies that given t and bt = 1, t+1(m) is strictly decreasing in x
t. Since [
p
(x 
s)] < 1
2 < [
p
(x   m)] for x 2 (m; m+s
2 ),
[
p
(x   s)][
p
(s   x)]
[
p
(x   m)][
p
(m   x)]
< 1:
So t+1(m) > t(m) if x
t < m+s
2 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Part 1: When the weak status quo is ruled out, t+1(m) is a function of t(m). Then
Lemma 1 implies that this function has a unique xed point in (~ (m);1). Therefore, I
26only need to show that this xed point is stable, which is equivalent to show that the slope
0 < dt+1(m)=dt(m) < 1. Since
t+1(m) =
t(m)[
p
(x
t   m)][
p
(m   x
t)]
t(m)[
p
(x
t   m)][
p
(m   x
t)] + (1   t(m))[
p
(x
t   s)][
p
(s   x
t)]
;
@t+1(m)
@t(m)
  
~ ;~ x
= 1, and  1 <
@t+1(m)
@x
t
  
~ ;~ x
@x
t
@t(m)
  
~ ;~ x
< 0 when  is large. Therefore, 0 <
dt+1(m)=dt(m) < 1.
Part 2: along the history ~ ht,
t+1(m) =
1(m)
1(m) + (1   1(m))
t Q
=1
[
p
(x
 s)][
p
(s x
)]
[
p
(x
 m)][
p
(m x
)]
:
Because ~ x < m+s
2 , the smallest solution to the equation g(x;t) = 0 is strictly less than m+s
2
for all t. Together with the fact that x
t > m, t(m) ! 1. Since g(x
t;t) = 0 for all t,
[
p
(x
t   m)] ! c.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Let WL be the social welfare with social learning and WN be the social welfare
without social learning. Part 1 is due to the decreasing probability of attacking in both
Emax and Emin. When  = w, let  be the regime change time. With social learn-
ing, PL(  tj = w) = 1  
t 1 P
=1
P( = j = w). Dene pL
t to be the probability
that an attack happens in period t conditional on no attack before with social learning
when  = w, then PL( = 1j = w) = pL
1. (So the probability that an attack hap-
pens in period t conditional on no attack before without social learning is pN
t = pL
t for
all t.) So, by induction, PL(  tj = w) =
t 1 Q
=0
(1   p), where pL
0 = pN
0  0. By
the same way, PN(  tj = w) = (1   pL
1)t 1. Because fpL
t gt is a decreasing sequence,
PL(  tj = w)  PN(  tj = w) for all t = 1;2;:::. Therefore, the cumula-
tive distribution function of  without social learning rst order stochastic dominates that
with social learning, which implies that the expected regime change time is longer with
social learning. Let Vt be the discounted value conditional that the regime changes in
period t, then Vt > V if t < , given any  2 (0;1), so social learning leads to ine-
ciency when  = w for any  2 (0;1). However, for any  > 0, there is a T such that    
1 P
t=T+1
PL( = tj = w)Vt  
1 P
t=T+1
PN( = tj = w)Vt
    < 
2 for all  2 (0;1). Fix this T, as
 ! 1,
   
T P
t=1
PL( = tj = w)Vt  
T P
t=1
PN( = tj = w)Vt
    < 
2. Therefore, for any  > 0, there
27is a w 2 (0;1) such that for all  2 (w;1),
   
1 P
t=1
PL( = tj = w)Vt  
1 P
t=1
PN( = tj = w)Vt
    <
. That is, as the discount factor goes to 1, the ineciency due to the delay of the regime
change caused by social learning disappears.
Part 2 is a consequence of Corollary 1. On one hand, because PN(regime changesj =
m) = 1, as  goes to 1, WN converges to 2(1   c). On the other hand, Corollary 1 implies
that PL(regime changesj = m) < 1, which in turns implies that WL is strictly less than
2(1   c). Note that innitely many attacks are prevented with or without social learning
and that the discounted value of the cost from nitely many attacks goes to 0 as  goes to
1. Therefore, there is a m 2 (0;1) such that for all  2 (m;1), social learning leads to a
lower social welfare value.
For Part 3, while with social learning, PL(attack, i.o.j = s) = 0, since either the
probability of attacking is constant at 0 from some nite period onward or the proba-
bility of two attacks in every period is bounded away from 0, without social learning,
PN(attack, i.o.j = s) > 0. Because the strong status quo won't fall, the fewer attacks,
the higher the social welfare. In particular,
W
L = (1   )
1 X
t=1
PL(no attack after period tj = s)V
L
t
W
N = (1   )
1 X
t=1
PN(no attack after period tj = s)V
N
t
where V L
t and V N
t are the expected discounted social welfare (conditional on the event that
no attack occurs after period t) with and without social learning respectively. Note for any
t, both V L
t and V N
t are nite. Because PL(attack, i.o.j = s) = 0, for any  > 0, there is a T
such that
   
1 P
t=T
PL(no attack after period tj = s)V L
t
    < . Because PN(attack, i.o.j = s) >
0, for any T 0, there is a  > 0 such that

  
1 P
t=T
PN(no attack after period tj = s)V N
t

   > 0. Fix
such 0 and T 0,
W
L > (1   )
T0 X
t=1
PL(no attack after period tj = s)V
L
t   
0;
while
W
N < (1   )
T0 X
t=1
PN(no attack after period tj = s)V
N
t   
0:
Therefore, there is a s such that for all  2 (s;1), WL > WN.
Q.E.D.
28Appendix B Useful Lemmas
In this section, I state and prove two lemmas, which are used in section 4.
Lemma 5 Suppose  = w has been ruled out. Given large , ~ (m) is decreasing in . As
 ! +1, ~ (m) converges to 0.
Proof.
Recall that ~ (m) is the belief about  = m, at which there is a unique ~ x 2 R such
that G(~ x; ~ ) = 0 (where ~ (w) = 0). Since G(x; ~ ) < 0 for all x 6= ~ x, G0(~ x; ~ ) = 0. As
in Proposition 2, instead of studying G(x; ~ ) directly, it is easier to study the function
g(x; ~ ) = [(
p
(x   m))   c]   c( 1
~ (m)   1)exp(

2(s   m)(2x   s   m)). Since ~ x is also the
unique solution to g(x; ~ ) = 0, g0(~ x; ~ ) = 0. That is,
[(
p
(~ x   m))   c]   c(
1
~ (m)
  1)exp(

2
(s   m)(2~ x   s   m)) = 0
(
p
(~ x   m))  
p
(s   m)c(
1
~ (m)
  1)exp(

2
(s   m)(2~ x   s   m)) = 0
Comparative static analysis shows that, for large , ~ (m) is decreasing in .
A necessary condition for the above system of equations is (
p
(~ x   m))   c =
(
p
(~ x m)) p
(s m) . The right hand side obviously goes to 0, as  goes to +1. Therefore, as  goes
to +1, (
p
(~ x   m)) goes to c, which implies that
p
(~ x   m) goes to  1(c). Hence, as
 ! +1, exp(

2(s m)(2~ x s m)) goes to exp( 
(s m)2
2 + 1(c)(s m)
p
). Suppose ~ (m)
is bounded away from 0 as  goes to +1, then ( 1
~ (m)  1)exp( 
(s m)2
2 + 1(c)(s m)
p
)
and
p
( 1
~ (m)   1)exp( 
(s m)2
2  +  1(c)(s   m)
p
) both go to 0. So g0(~ x; ~ ) > 0, which
leads to the contradiction. As a result, as  ! +1, ~ (m) ! 0.
Lemma 6 In an N-players N +1-states static regime change game, if Sj is a cuto strategy
such that Sj = 1 if xj   xj and Sj = 0 if xj >  xj for all players j 6= i, then player i's best
response is a cuto strategy such that Si = 1 if xi   xi and Si = 0 if xi >  xi.
Proof.
I show this lemma with the general private signal structure mentioned in footnote 4.
Let Lk(x) =
f(xjmk)
f(xjm1) to be the likelihood ratio, then Lk(x) is increasing in x for all k and
Lk(x)=Lk0(x) is increasing in x for any k > k0. Given Sj such that Sj = 1 if xj   xj and Sj = 0
if xj >  xj for all players j 6= i, if player i chooses to attack, then conditional on  = mk, the
probability of the regime change is Zk = Pr(there are at least k   1 players choosing to attack
besides player ijmk). Note Zk is independent of xi, and Zk+1  Zk  1 for all k = 1;2;:::;N.
29Then the interim payo of player i when she observes private signal xi and chooses to attack
is:
ui(xi;S i) =
N P
k=1
kLk(xi)Zk
N+1 P
k=1
kLk(xi)
:
Now, consider two private signals of player i, x and x0 with x < x0. Denote Lk(x) = Lk and
Lk(x0) = L0
k. Then,
ui(x;S i)   ui(x
0;S i)
=
1
Q
[(
N X
k=1
kLkZk)(
N+1 X
k=1
kL
0
k)   (
N X
k=1
kL
0
kZk)(
N+1 X
k=1
kLk)]
=
1
Q
f
N X
k=1
X
qk
kq(LkL
0
q   L
0
kLq)(Zk   Zq) + N+1
N X
k=1
(L
0
N+1Lk   LN+1L
0
k)Zkg:
Each term in the rst part is positive because LkL0
q   L0
kLq < 0 and Zk   Zq < 0 for all
q  k. Every term in the second part is also positive because L0
N+1Lk   LN+1L0
k > 0 for
all k  N. Therefore, ui(x;S i) is decreasing in x. Together with the dominant region of
attacking and the dominant region of not attacking, this monotonicity implies that player
i's best response is also a cuto strategy such that Si = 1 if xi   xi and Si = 0 if xi >  xi.
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